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IN RE BANNING:
THE HAWAII SUPREME COURT KEEPS
HAWAIIAN BEACHES ACCESSIBLE
CatherineE. Decker"
I. INTRODUCTION

In Hawaii, a large portion of all beaches are owned by the public.
In the 1968 decision, In re Ashford,I the Hawaii Supreme Court held that
the boundary between privately-owned upland property and the publiclyowned beach was the vegetation line.2 In most other jurisdictions the
line delineating private and public property is the mean high tide line.'
The vegetation line usually occurs further upland than the mean high tide
line. Members of the public are therefore able to use a significantly
greater portion of the coastal zone in Hawaii than in most other
jurisdictions.
Swelling populations and the tourism industry have increased the
need for access to Hawaii's state-owned beaches. Property owners of
land abutting the vegetation line have previously attempted to meet the
public's need for access to the shoreline recreation areas by allowing
members of the public to cross over their land. A recent Hawaii
Supreme Court decision, In re Banning,4 further bolsters the ability of
the public to enjoy the Hawaiian coastal zone by encouraging landowners
to continue this practice.
*

University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1995.

1. Michael A. Town & William Yuen, Public Access to Beaches in Hawaii: "A
Social Necessity," 10 HAW. B.J. 5 (1973) (citing In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw.
1968)). (This article was used extensively in writing the Hawaiian implied dedication
section of this Note).
2. Town & Yuen, 10 HAW. B.J. at 5 (citing In re Ashford, 440 P.2d at 77).
3. See generally, Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 25 (1935)
(holding that upper boundary of tidelands is medium high tide between the springs and
the neaps).
4. 832 P.2d 724 (Haw. 1992).
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The Banning court held that if the public's use of an accreted parcel
fronting shoreline property was both open and continuous, that use did
not raise a conclusive presumption that the littoral owner had implicitly
dedicated the land to the public. The court's rejection of an easement in
favor of the public in this particular accreted parcel will actually promote
beach access. A private land owner in the future will continue to allow
the public to use her property to access the beach without fear of losing
her property rights through the doctrine of implied dedication.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii held correctly in Banning, because
there is a strong public policy favoring open beaches within the State.
This Note analyzes the doctrine of implied dedication and accretion in
Hawaii. It then discusses the Banning court's ruling on whether a
landowner is presumed to have dedicated her property to the public if she
allows open and continuous use for the prescriptive period. The Note
discusses California's contrasting approach to the doctrine of implied
dedication. It concludes that the Hawaii court made a prudent decision,
in line with at least eight other jurisdictions, that will promote public
access to one of Hawaii's greatest natural resources, its beaches.
II. IMPLIED DEDICATION IN HAWAII

A. Common Law
A dedication is the devotion of land to a public use by an "unequivocal act of the owner of the fee manifesting the intention that it shall be
accepted and used presently or in the future for such a public purpose. 5
A common law dedication can be either express or implied. It is express
when the purpose to give the land to public use is embodied in a grant,
such as a deed. It is implied when an intention to devote the land is
clearly manifested by the conduct of the owner.6 Because a court can
take away an owner's property through implied dedication, it is essential
that the required intent to dedicate the land be plainly manifest.
A common law dedication may occur without any statement, written
or spoken, because a landowner who permits the public to use her land
for a long period may be held to have made an offer of implied

5. 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 1 (1956).
6. Wensel v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 185 Iowa 680, 692 (1919).
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dedication.7 The rationale behind this theory is that the owner is
estopped to deny permanent public access when she has allowed the
public to use the land for an extended period of time.'
Hawaii courts adopted the theory of implied dedication in 1869 in
The King v. Cornwell.9 In Cornwell the Hawaii Supreme Court held that
to establish implied dedication "there should be an intention and act of
dedication on the part of the owner, and an acceptance on the part of the
public.' 10 When there is no express offer, the offer may be implied
under the circumstances." Acceptance may also be implied because
public use of a beach has satisfied the "acceptance" element of the
doctrine.' Therefore, the duration and type of public use can fulfill both
the owner's intent to dedicate land to the public and the public's
acceptance.' 3 It is also noteworthy that the offer and acceptance in a
dedication are questions of fact.' 4
The two commonly recognized forms of implied dedication are
implied-in-fact and implied-in-law. The Cornwell court, however, did
not divide the doctrine into its two current forms when it adopted implied
dedication as part of Hawaiian common law."' Dedication implied-in-fact
is a dedication for a period less than the prescriptive period that may be
established by proof of the owner's actual consent to the dedication.
When the owner has permitted the public to use the land for such a short
time, her intent is critical.' 6 Dedication implied-in-law occurs when the
owner has acquiesced to the public use for longer than the prescriptive
period. The public's use of the land becomes the critical factor in
determining if the dedication was implied-in-law. 7 Thus, the owner's

7. ROGERA. CUNNINGHAM, ETAL., THELAW OF PROPERTY § 11.6, at 801 (2d
ed. 1993).
8. Id.
9. 3 Haw. 154 (1869).
10. Id. at 161.
11. See Vitants M. Gulbis, Annotation, Implied Acceptance, By Public Use, of
Dedication of Beach or Shoreline Adjoining Public Waters, 24 A.L.R. 4th 294 (1983);
see also 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 37 (1956).
12. DAVID J. BROWER, ACCESS TO THE NATION'S BEACHES: LEGAL AND PLANNING
PERSPECTIVES 23 (1978).
13. 23 AM. JUR. 2d Dedication §§ 36, 55 (1983).
14. Meshberg v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 429 A.2d 865, 868 (Conn. 1980).
15. Town & Yuen, supranote 1, at 17.
16. Id. at 16 (citing Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 55 (Cal. 1970)).
17. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d at 56.
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intent to dedicate property for public use is implied not from the owner's
acts but from the nature of the public's adverse use.
The difference between dedication implied-in-fact and dedication
implied-in-law is in how each doctrine is proved. Dedication implied-in-fact is proved by showing the owner's actual intent to dedicate,
while dedication implied-in-law is proved by the public's acceptance of
the dedication.' 8
In addition to the two requirements of intent and acceptance, two
other elements must be shown to establish an implied dedication of land.
The first is the duration of use.19 Courts differ in their durational
requirement for dedication.' The second is "public use." This means
that the use must be substantial rather than casual. 2 People must have
used the property as they would have used a public recreation area. The
policy behind these requirements lies in the power of the doctrine of
implied dedication to strip a property right from a landowner. Courts do
not want to allow infrequent use by a few people to be the basis of an
action to secure rights through implied dedication. Hawaii's common
law of implied dedication has reflected these and other policy considerations and has been supplemented by legislative action.'
B. Legislation
The Hawaii Supreme Court acknowledged in Hawaii County v.
Sotomura, 3 that public policy "favors extending to public use and
ownership as much of Hawaii's shoreline as is reasonably possible. "'
The legislature codified this policy in 1969.1 The Act's purpose is "to
encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the
public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons

18. Id. at 55-56.
19. Town & Yuen, supra note 1, at 17.
20. Compare Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 55 (1970) (five year
requirement for implied dedication) with HAW. Rv.STAT. § 657-31 (1985) (twenty year
requirement for implied dedication). Hawaii's statutory period was changed from 10 to
20 years in 1973. Campbell v. Hipawai Corp., 639 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Haw. App. 1982).
21. County of Orange v. Chandler-Sherman Corp., 54 Cal. App. 3d 561, 565
(1976).
22. HAW. Rav. STAT.

§ 520-1 (1985).

23. 517 P.2d 57 (Haw. 1973).
24. Id. at 61-62.

25. HAW. REv.

STAT.

§§ 520-1 to 520-8 (1985).
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The legislature attempted to
entering thereon for such purposes."'
balance the need for beach access with the littoral landowners' rights to
the enjoyment of their land. Striving to promote a spirit of community
so that beach access will be widely available to the public, the legislature
secured the littoral landowners' property rights in the same Act: "No
person shall gain any rights to any land by prescription or otherwise, as
a result of any usage thereof for recreational purposes as provided in this
chapter."' It is the public's use, not the landowner's permission, that
defines the applicability of this section. Recreational purpose is defined
to include "swimming, boating-camping, and picnicking," activities that
obviously give the public a broad range of use.'
The legislature sought to encourage landowners to make their lands
available for recreational use, and it changed Hawaii's common law rules
of liability and prescriptive use in order to achieve that goal.
C. California'sApproach to Implied Dedication
California has taken a very different approach in developing the
doctrine of implied dedication. A discussion of California case law
provides a background for the choice the Supreme Court of Hawaii was
faced with in deciding In re Banning.
Two California Supreme Court cases, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz and
Dietz v. King,29 form the critical case law in establishing implied
The Gion court found implied-in-law
dedication in California.3"
dedication by adverse use of beach property and granted an easement to
the public. The court held that public use for the prescriptive period
coupled with the acquiescence of the owner of the land is conclusive
evidence of an intent to dedicate the property.31
The court's holding in Gion has been widely criticized. Allowing
mere public use to create conclusive evidence of an owner's intent to
dedicate strikes many as unfair. The two policy grounds on which most

26. Id. at § 520-1 (1985).
27. Id. at § 520-7.

28. Id. at § 520-2(3).
29. The cases were consolidated and are hereinafter referred to as Gion.
30. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970).
31. Id. at 56.
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of the criticism has centered are that it is unfair to hospitable landowners
and that it will cause widespread closing of previously open land.32
III. ACCRETION
Banning dealt with a parcel of land that had accreted onto the littoral
owner's property. Accretion has been defined as an addition to riparian
land gradually and imperceptibly made by the water to which the land is
contiguous.33 Accretion is new soil that has been deposited and increases
the size of a piece of property. The Hawaii Supreme Court determined
in Halstead v. Gay that "land now above the high water mark, which has
been formed by imperceptible accretion against the shoreline of a grant,
has become attached by the law of accretion to the land described in the
grant and belongs to the littoral proprietor."34 The public policy behind
this grant of ownership to the littoral landowner is that it preserves
littoral access.35
In 1985, the Hawaii legislature codified the common law of accretion
by stating, in part, "[a]n applicant for registration of land by accretion
shall prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the accretion is
natural and permanent. 'Permanent' means that the accretion has been
in existence at least twenty years. "36 In addition, the legislature modified
the laws regarding adverse possession to allow "any person," not just the
littoral landowner, to register a claim to accreted land by proving it has
been natural and permanent for twenty years.37
IV. IN RE BANMING

A. Facts
In 1928, a community trust was established to operate a private
beach club for the use of its members and to maintain four beach
access-ways for members of a residential development located in Kailua

32. John Briscoe & Jan Stevens, Gion After Seven Years:Revolution or Evolution?
53 Los ANGELES B.J. 207, 219 (1977).

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 81 (1966).
Halstead v. Gay, 7 Haw. 587 (1889).
State v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 734 (Haw. 1977).
HAw. REv. STAT. § 501-33 (1985).
HAw. REV. STAT. § 669-1 (1985).
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on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. 38 This instrument gave the trustees
ownership of two lots that are at the heart of the Banning dispute. Lot
20-A is a 1.36 acre rectangular portion of land joined on one side by
residential lots and on the other side by a long, narrow beach access-way
designated as lot 20-X.39 In 1967, the City and County of Honolulu
acquired a public easement for access over lot 20-X. 4° Lot 20-X is also
bounded on one side by several residential lots.4 Both lot 20-A and
20-X have a mauka (mountainside) boundary along North Kalaheo
Avenue and a makai (oceanside) boundary along the high water mark.42
Since 1925, when the makai boundaries to lots 20-A and 20-X were
first delineated, gradual accretion has occurred. An estimated .251 acre
of land has slowly deposited onto lot 20-A.43 The public has used the
accreted parcel for access to the beach as well as for recreational
purposes because access to lot 20-X was blocked. During the time
period that accretion occurred, an ironwood tree grew in the way of lot
20-X and obstructed beach access. This forced the public onto the
accreted parcel of lot 20-A.
B. The Land CourtDecision
In September, 1988, the trustees filed a petition for Registration of
Title and Redesignation of Lot with Accretion in Hawaii's land court to
register the .25 acre of new soil in lot 20-A.' The State and a neighbor
of lot 20-X argued that the accreted land was not natural and permanent.
They also argued that the accreted parcel should be granted to the State
38. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, In reBanning, 832 P.2d 724 (Haw. 1992) (No.
15109).
39. In re Banning, 832 P.2d 724, 726 (Haw. 1992).
40. Id. at 727.
41. One of the residential lots is owned by the Bremners. The Bremners are also
appellees in the appeal from the decree of the land court regarding accretion to lot 20-A.
This Note, however, focuses on the State's arguments on appeal.
42. In re Banning, 832 P.2d at 727.
43. Id. Lot 20-X also has grown through accretion. This accretion is not at issue.
The trustees guaranteed that they would permanently allow access to the beach through
lot 20-X. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, In re Banning, 832 P.2d 724 (Haw. 1992)
(No. 15109).
44. In re Banning, 832 P.2d at 727. Registration was pursuant to HAW. REV.
STAT. § 501-33 (1985). The land court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all
applications for the registration of title to land and easements or rights in land. HAw.
REv. STAT.

§ 501-1 (1985).
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for the public's use and enjoyment because the trustees had acquiesced
in the public use for such a long time.45
The land court made two holdings. It granted the trustees their
petition for title to the accreted property. However, the land court
reserved two easements in favor of the State of Hawaii because of the
trustees' long acquiescence to public use. The land court determined that
the rights to accreted land could be acquired by "adverse" public use
under the theory of implied dedication as it had been articulated in the
California case, Gion v. Santa Cruz. 6
C. Arguments on Appeal
The trustees made several arguments on appeal. First, they argued
that the land court erred in finding that there was continuous public use
of the accreted land. The trustees argued that the land court's holding
that the public had used the beach was clearly erroneous because it was
impossible for the witnesses to differentiate beach club members from
members of the public. The trustees also argued that the use of the
beach had been blocked for a period of time and thus was not continuous.

47

Second, they argued that the land court erred in finding that the
accreted parcel had been dedicated by implication.' The trustees argued
that the land court's reliance on the California case law was misplaced.
There was no evidence that the trustees intended to dedicate their
property. There was no evidence of continuous public use nor was there
evidence that the government accepted the dedication. Further, the
trustees argued that the land court erred when it concluded that the
statute49 did not apply to limit landowner liability and, in the alternative,
that the land court erred when it concluded that the prescriptive period
and the accretion period ran concurrently. Finally, the trustees argued
that the easements must fail because they are vaguely defined.5

45. In re Banning, 832 P.2d at 727.
46. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970).
47. In re Banning, 832 P.2d at 728.
48. Id.
49. "Rights. No person shall gain any rights to any land by prescription or
otherwise, as a result of any usage thereof for recreational purposes as provided in this
chapter." HAw. REv. STAT. § 520-7(1985).
50. Id. at 728-32.
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The State argued that the evidence demonstrated many years of
public use and access over the accreted land. The State also argued that
implied dedication of the accreted parcel had created two public
easements.
D. The Hawaii Supreme Court Decision
The Hawaii Supreme Court held that implied dedication as
articulated in Gion did not apply in Hawaii. The court followed their
own standards as set forth in Cornwell. 1 "While continuous adverse
public use raises an assumption of implied dedication in Hawaii ... it is

not a conclusive presumption. Further, Cornwell requires adverse public
use unopposed and acquiesced in for a period longer than the prescriptive
'
The court used the statutory
period to infer public dedication." 52
definition of the period for prescription: "No person shall commence an
action to recover possession of any lands, or make any entry thereon,
unless within twenty years after the right to bring the action first
accrued. "I Since the land court had not made a finding that the accreted
parcel had been used for more than twenty years, the public's use of the
accreted parcel was not a sufficient length of time to establish an
easement by implied dedication.'
The court also held that the period for accretion could run concurrently with the period of prescription for implied dedication. The court
stated as its rationale that "the legislature has indicated that adverse use
can establish a claim to accreted land. "I This allows any person to
register a claim to accreted land.
Finally, the court held that even if there had been implied dedication
in this case, the grant of the two easements would fail because its
description is too vague.56 Because the descriptions of the easements
were not confined to a single line, each entrance onto the land would
have defined the location of the easement?
51. 3 Haw. 154 (1869).
52. In re Banning, 832 P.2d at 730 (citations omitted).
53. EIAw. REv. STAT. § 657-31 (1985).
54. In re Banning, 832 P.2d at 731.
55. Id. at 728, n.4.
56. Id. at 731.
57. Two other important holdings are beyond the scope of this Note. First, the
court held that HAW. REV. STAT. § 264-1 (1985), which applies to trails, was not
relevant in this case. The State had contended that it had an easement for public access
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V. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court of Hawaii's decision in Banning will lead to
greater overall access to Hawaiian beaches. The court's interpretation
of implied dedication is in line with the legislative purpose of encouraging owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public
for recreational purposes. 8
The land court had not applied the recreational prescription statute
because it believed the trustees had not shown that they had asserted
dominion over the property and then given the public permission to use
it. The land court put the burden on the trustees to show that they had
blocked entrance to the property instead of on the State to show a public
claim of ownership. The Supreme Court of Hawaii correctly placed the
burden on the State because the statute is conditioned on the public's
usage and not the landowner's permission. Banning is significant
because it is a matter of first impression in construing the intent of the
legislature.
In rejecting the California doctrine of implied dedication, which
holds that public use for the prescriptive period raises a conclusive
presumption of a grant of property to the public, the court will preserve
and promote the existing practice of landowners allowing the public to
cross their land to access the beach.
Hawaii will avoid the problem of landowners fencing off their
property for fear of losing it. This has happened in California as a result
of Gion.59 The reaction was summed up by the California Appellate

along a shoreline trail whenever the owner fails to exercise acts of ownership over it and
has acquiesced in the public's use of it for more than five years under this statute. The
court held that the trustees had not built a trail for the public and therefore HAW. REv.
STAT. § 264-1 did not apply. Second, the court held that the neighbors to lot 20-X had
standing to enforce the rights of the general public in the parcel under Akau v. Olohana
Corp., 652 P.2d 1130 (Haw. 1982). The necessary element of "injury in fact" had been
demonstrated in the neighbor's case. In re Banning, 832 P.2d at 732.
58. HAW. REv. STAT. § 520-1 (1985).
59.
Owners of coastal and inland waterway property have been fencing off access
routes at a record rate in an effort to prevent a recent California Supreme
Court decision from affecting their lands.... Under provisions of the Supreme
Court ruling, those who have allowed trespassing or have failed to effectively
halt it stand the greatest chance of losing their property or a portion of it.
Phillip Fradkin, Owners of Waterway Property Pushing to Block Access Paths, L.A.
TIMEs, July 34, 1970, §1 at 3.
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Court in County of Orange v. Chandler Sherman Corp. "Reaction to
[Gion] was prompt. In addition to soaring sales of chain link fences, as
owners of shoreline property frantically attempted to bar the public from
the use of their property, the case generated a spate of law review
comment which was generally critical."'
The current state of the law in California was confirmed in Bess v.

County of Humbolt.61 Bess reiterated Gion's holding that litigants
seeking to show that land has been dedicated to the public need only
demonstrate that people have used the land as they would have used
public land. Specifically, if the property were beach or shoreline, the

litigant need merely show the land was used as if it were a public
recreation area. 62
Hawaii has followed many other jurisdictions in rejecting this
Courts in New Jersey,63 New
approach to property allocation.
Hampshire, ' Michigan,' Maryland,' Florida,67 Georgia, 6 and South

60. 54 Cal. App. 3d at 564 (citing William G. Hayter, Note, Implied Dedication
in California:A Needfor Legislative Reform, 7 CAL. W.L. REv. 259 (1970); Michael
M. Berger, Nice Guys FinishLast-At Least They Lose Their Property:Gion v. City of
Santa Cruz, 8 CAL. W.L. REv. 75 (1971); Susan P. Finlay & David J. VanTil,
Calfornians Need Beaches-Maybe Yours! 7 SAN DiEGo L. RFy. 605 (1970); Richard
E. Llewelyn II, Note, The Common Law Doctrine of Implied Dedicationand Its Effects
on the California CoastlinePropertyOwner: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 4 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 438 (1971); Robert T. Burke, Public or Private Ownership of Beaches: An
Alternative to Implied Dedication, 18 UCLA L. REV. 795 (1971); Note, Implied
Dedication of Beach to Public Use, 59 CAL. L. REv. 231 (1971); Charles R. Manzoni,
Jr., Implied Dedication:A Threat to the Owners of California'sShoreline, 11 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 327 (1971).
61. Bess v. County of Humbolt, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1550 (1992).
62. Id.
63. Murphy v. Burough of Point Pleasant Beach, 8 A.2d 116, 118 (N.J. 1939)
(government money spent on upkeep of beach property and use by the public did not
conclusively prove the land had been dedicated).
64. McInnis v. Hampton, 112 A.2d 691, 694 (N.H. 1972) (public use for more
than twenty years did not compel a finding of implied dedication).
65. Kempf v. Ellixson, 244 N.W.2d 476, 478 (Mich. 1976) (a showing of public
use did not conclusively determine an easement to the public had been granted in
property on shore of lake).
66. Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor and Council of Ocean City, 332
A.2d 630, 635 (Md. 1975) (evidence of long public use did not raise conclusive
presumption that oceanfront land had been dedicated to the public).
67. City of Miami Beach v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., 14 So. 2d 172, 175
(Fla. 1943) (mere fact of use by the public for an extended period of time without
consent or objection of owner does not show an intent to dedicate ocean front land to
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Carolina69 all have held that permissive use alone will not, in itself, give
rise to an implied dedication of property to the public.
Idaho, just as in Hawaii, has a statute encouraging landowners to
make their lands available to the public.' ° In a 1979 decision, State ex
rel. Haman v. Fox, the court rejected Gion's theory of implied dedication
as inconsistent with legislative purpose and against public policy.7'
VI. CONCLUSION

The Hawaii Supreme Court prudently rejected California's implied
dedication approach. Although the public is not entitled to an easement
granting access to the beach on the particular accreted parcel of land, the
public will enjoy an overall benefit from the continued practice of
landowners allowing the public to cross over their privately owned land.
This general policy of promoting neighborly goodwill towards the public
will far outweigh the loss of the easement to the public in the accreted
parcel.

public use).
68. Lines v. State, 264 S.E.2d 891, 897 (Ga. 1980) (mere use of one's property
by a portion of the public, even for an extended period of time, is not sufficient to
authorize an inference that the property has been dedicated to a public use).
69. State v. Beach Co., 248 S.E.2d 115, 119 (S.C. 1978) (dedication of beachfront
area on an island could not be implied from permissive, sporadic and recreational use of
the property even though some of it had been used extensively).
70. IDAHO CODE § 36-1604 (1977).
71. 584 P.2d 1093 (Idaho 1979).

